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I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Flaherty’s Restoring the Global Judiciary revisits a
longstanding debate among legal scholars and practitioners: 1
should courts intervene in foreign affairs and national security?
Can they do so effectively?
Roughly two diverging approaches to these questions have
emerged over time. 2 One camp has doubted the democratic
legitimacy of judicial interference with foreign affairs.3 Judges are
not elected, members of that camp point out. They are therefore
unaccountable to the public. They should not opine on matters that
implicate high diplomacy and core national interests—the kinds of
issues that frequently arise in the foreign and security domain.
Additionally, skeptics of judicial review in foreign affairs and
national security have advanced functional arguments to explain
* Doctoral Candidate and Lecturer on Law (Fall 2019), Harvard Law School; Global
Order Fellow, Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See generally MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2019).
2. For an overview of these arguments and related scholarship, see Elena Chachko,
Foreign Affairs in Court: Lessons from CJEU Targeted Sanctions Jurisprudence, 44 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 1-3 (2019).
3. Id.
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why courts should stay out. Courts, they have argued, simply lack
the institutional competence to resolve complex foreign and
security matters. They do not have the necessary expertise.4 The
nature of judicial adjudication is such that it simply cannot keep up
with fast evolving, time sensitive foreign and security decisions.
Another common argument is that there is simply no law to apply
in this area. Proponents of this approach also underscore that
courts lack access to classified material, which tends to be essential
for understanding the full scope of the matter being adjudicated
and the implications of a ruling on the merits.5
In national security emergencies in particular, the argument
goes, courts know that they have no choice but to defer to the
political branches.6 Judges risk disobedience if they venture into
foreign affairs and national security in such circumstances because
of the high stakes of emergencies. The concern is that policymakers
would be so convinced of the necessity of their actions for
protecting the nation and swayed by public expectation for bold
measures that they might violate a judicial order. Such
disobedience would damage the separation of powers and
undermine the stability of the already delicate balance among
government branches.
The opposing camp, which seems to have grown since the
September 11 attacks, 7 rejects these premises. Members of that
camp, including scholars like Harold Koh and Thomas Franck,
assert that there is no analytical or practical difference between
foreign and security policy and domestic policy, which courts
review all the time. 8 They stress that foreign and domestic matters
have become increasingly indistinguishable in an age of
globalization and deep penetration of foreign factors and
international law into the domestic sphere. Furthermore, they
criticize judicial abdication in an area that often involves

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY AND THE COURTS 18 (2007) (“In emergencies, the judges have no sensible
alternative but to defer heavily to executive action, and the judges know this”).
7. See infra Section II.A.
8. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE
OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 43 (1992); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 146-48, 218-24 (1990).
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significant harm to individual liberties and broad, ever more
ambitious assertions of executive power.
This debate has become rather stagnant. The same arguments
are constantly repeated without resolution, and the chasm
between the two camps seems at times to defy compromise. What
is more, different kinds of foreign affairs and national security
matters are often lumped together under the broad categories of
“political questions” and other strands of non-justiciability and
non-reviewability doctrine. The time has come to move this debate
forward.
New arguments are necessary in order to do so. It is also
essential to disaggregate the category of foreign and security
matters. From a court’s point of view, a decision to start a war with
another nation is not the same as a decision to target an AQAP
operative in Yemen with lethal force. A decision with respect to
sovereign immunity from judicial process is not the same as a
decision to recognize a foreign state. And as Zivotofsky v. Clinton
has established,9 even decisions of the latter kind—quintessential
foreign policy decisions predominantly guided by politics—may
have perfectly justiciable aspects. While the Supreme Court was
not ready to decide the status of Jerusalem as a matter of US policy,
it concluded that it was entirely capable of resolving the run-of-the
mill separation of powers question of who has the authority to
make and enforce such a policy—Congress or the President. The
Court subsequently did just that in Zivotofsky v. Kerry.10
Professor Flaherty’s comprehensive book contributes to
moving the debate forward by offering new and creative
justifications for judicial review in foreign affairs. For instance,
Flaherty draws on Anne-Marie Slaughter’s work about
international networks to argue that courts should be more, not
less engaged in reviewing executive action in foreign affairs. By
nature, he maintains, the executive is far more active in
international networks of regulators and other policymakers than
legislators or judges. International networks thus serve as a power
multiplier for the already powerful executive. They exacerbate the
problem of executive overreach and widen the power discrepancy
9. 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (holding that the political question doctrine does not bar the
Court’s jurisdiction to decide whether Congress could require the President to indicate
Israel as the place of birth on a passport of an individual born in Jerusalem).
10. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015).
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among the branches. According to Flaherty, this structural
advantage justifies robust judicial oversight of executive action in
foreign affairs and national security, even more so than in domestic
policy.11
One could challenge this argument, but I will leave that for
another day. Instead, I briefly consider other underexplored
avenues for advancing the conversation about judicial review in
foreign and security matters, building on my previous work in this
area. One such avenue is testing the validity of the functional
arguments against judicial review through empirical research. The
other is developing administrative law approaches to judicial
review in foreign affairs, which remain underdeveloped in current
US scholarship.
It is important to note that these approaches bracket the
normative question of whether courts should review foreign and
security measures as a matter of democratic legitimacy. This is not
a question that can be fully resolved with purely empirical or
doctrinal tools. The answer depends on one’s normative priors.
There is something almost mythical about how many in the legal
community—especially judges—perceive and talk about foreign
affairs and national security. From the idea of “raison d’état” and
its European provenance 12 through Justice Sutherland’s famous
Curtiss-Wright 13 dicta to countless paragraphs in modern-day
federal court decisions and executive branch opinions, 14 many
11. See FLAHERTY, supra note 1, at 149-66.
12. For an overview, see Walter Carlsnaes, Foreign Policy, HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 298, 299-301 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2013).
13. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).
14. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018) (“when the President
adopts ‘a preventive measure . . . in the context of international affairs and national
security,’ he is ‘not required to conclusively link all of the pieces in the puzzle before
[courts] grant weight to [his] empirical conclusions’”) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34-35 (2010)).
We are one with the dissent that the Government’s ‘authority and expertise in
these matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure
the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals.’ But when it comes to
collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, ‘the lack of
competence on the part of the courts is marked,’ and respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate. One reason for that respect is that national
security and foreign policy concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront
evolving threats in an area where information can be difficult to obtain and the
impact of certain conduct difficult to assess … In this context, conclusions must
often be based on informed judgment rather than concrete evidence, and that
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have consistently portrayed these matters as sui generis. This
quasi-axiom has proved incredibly difficult to change.
Nevertheless, fact-based and administrative law-focused
approaches do allow us to move forward from abstract assertions
about judicial institutional incompetence and dearth of doctrinal
tools to a more nuanced and empirically informed approach. Even
if they cannot resolve the key normative question and fail to
persuade the adherents of the democratic legitimacy critique, they
could undermine (or, indeed, support) important elements of the
conventional wisdom.
II. DRAWING ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Until fairly recently, administrative law was almost entirely
absent from the scholarly conversation about judicial review in
foreign affairs and national security. The debate has largely
focused on constitutional concepts: separation of powers,
executive power, Article III constraints on justiciability and
federalism. In certain areas, such as international human rights
litigation and foreign sovereign immunity, the debate has centered
on particular statutory frameworks such as the Alien Tort Statute15
and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.16 Moreover, the field of
foreign relations law has generally tended to focus on traditional
forms of foreign and security policymaking such as international
agreements and relatively large-scale use of military force.
Attention in the field to novel foreign and security policy measures
that increasingly characterize modern practice has thus far been
limited.17
Consequently, administrative law has remained on the
sidelines of the conversation. Important contributions from

reality affects what we may reasonably insist on from the Government (citations
omitted).
See also Louis Fisher, The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From Curtiss-Wright to
Zivotofsky, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 149 (2016).
15. 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2012).
16. 28 U.S.C § 1602-11 (2016).
17. For instance, a recent comprehensive edited volume on comparative foreign
relations law focuses on traditional questions of international agreements, federalism,
domestic application of international law, engagement and disengagement from
international institutions, immunity and comity, and use of military force. See THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019).
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several scholars, including Curtis Bradley,18 Jean Galbraith, David
Zaring, 19 and Ganesh Sitaraman, 20 have begun to explore
administrative law in relation to judicial review in foreign policy
and national security matters. Adrian Vermeule drew on examples
in the areas of foreign affairs and national security to illustrate how
flexible administrative law doctrine can be when courts wish to
defer to the executive.21 Still, there is much more work to be done.
One of the reasons why administrative law may prove useful
in thinking about judicial review in foreign affairs and national
security is the evolving nature of foreign and security policy in the
21st century. One aspect of this evolution is the significance of
international soft law and informal regulatory cooperation in
modern governance. Galbraith and Zaring have argued that judicial
oversight of these practices requires modification of general
administrative law doctrine in light of foreign relations law
principles to allow the executive greater flexibility than
administrative law would otherwise allow.22
Other key trends in how US foreign and security policy has
been conducted in the past two decades have also expanded the
role of administrative agencies in designing and implementing
related measures. This new role goes beyond the traditional
diplomatic and military work of foreign and security policydedicated agencies like the State and Defense Departments and the
intelligence community. In previous work I have argued that US
foreign and security policy has become increasingly individualized
in the past two decades.23 I show that the United States has applied
a growing number of measures that target natural and legal
persons directly to advance a variety of foreign and security policy
goals, from counterterrorism to combatting Russian election
interference and Chinese nefarious cyber operations against US
18 . Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649
(2000).
19. Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 735 (2014).
20. Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489 (2014).
21. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095
(2009).
22. Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 19, at 736.
23. Elena Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063, 1063 (2020)
(available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440760
[https://perma.cc/WG4H-RBLQ]).

2020]

REVISITING JUDICIAL REVIEW

1269

companies and institutions. These measures include targeted
killings, detentions, targeted economic sanctions, no fly lists and
other travel restrictions, as well as individualized cyber
countermeasures such as indictments of individual hackers and
targeted offensive cyber action.
The individualization of US foreign and security policy has
coincided with greater participation of a range of administrative
agencies in designing and implementing individualized
measures.24 Agencies like the Treasury Department, the Homeland
Security Department, the Justice Department and many others
operate in this area within broad legal frameworks that Congress
or the President have put in place over time. This has created
increasingly independent bureaucratic mechanisms that have
persisted across administrations.
I call this type of government action—administrative agencies
repeatedly imposing individualized foreign and security policy
measures within broad legal frameworks—administrative national
security. Administrative national security resembles ordinary
administrative adjudication in that it involves application of law to
fact in individual cases. The constant development of technology
that allows for precision targeting of individuals at relatively little
cost is likely to further expand this practice.
Presidential supervision of administrative national security
has largely decreased over time. Presidents have laid the
groundwork for these administrative mechanisms through
executive orders and directives at a certain point in time. But the
bureaucracies that grew out of these actions have gradually come
to function with limited direct presidential oversight and
engagement.25
For example, sanctions executive orders issued by President
Bush in the areas of counterterrorism and non-proliferation now
serve as standing authorities that the Treasury and State
Departments rely upon to impose individual sanctions against
suspected terrorists and proliferators. A vast interagency
watchlisting system that grew out of Bush-era directives and
orders was expanded and entrenched under the last two
administrations. Interagency targeted killings practices
24. Id.
25. Chachko, supra note 23, Section III.A.1.
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introduced by the Obama administration survived, with important
modifications, under the Trump administration. 26 Internal
oversight of targeted cyber action has become looser under the
Trump administration. 27 The policies that the individualized
measures aim to advance have no expiration date and could
continue indefinitely.
The administrative national security bureaucracy creates a
path dependency in the trajectory of US foreign and security
policy. 28 Calibrated measures for addressing key challenges at
relatively little economic and strategic cost are appealing tools for
administrations to use in addressing hard policy problems. They
can be applied within existing legal frameworks without further
congressional approval—a significant feature in an era of political
gridlock. Over time, public scrutiny of these practices has
atrophied, although once highly controversial individualized
measures like blacklisting and targeted killings continue to be
applied under the public radar.29 Administrative national security
therefore gives the executive options that have become convenient
fallbacks for dealing with a wide variety of foreign and security
challenges. In addition, administrations might continue relying on
individualized measures simply by virtue of bureaucratic inertia.
These factors create structural incentives for reliance on
administrative national security going forward. Presidents are
likely to default into using those measures.
What does all of this have to do with judicial review and
administrative law? First, the foregoing illustrates that
individualized foreign policy and national security measures
applied by administrative agencies have become an important
26. Id. Section III.A.1.a.
27. See Robert Chesney, The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA,
LAWFARE (July 26, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operationsand-new-ndaa [https://perma.cc/6FRL-6QMB]; National Cyber Strategy of the United
States of America, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86G7HAW6]. See also, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, White House Authorizes ‘Offensive Cyber Operations’
to
Deter
Foreign
Adversaries,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-authorizesoffensive-cyber-operations-to-deter-foreign-adversaries-boltonsays/2018/09/20/b5880578-bd0b-11e8-b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html
[https://perma.cc/TBE6-FLK9].
28. Chachko, supra note 23, Section III.A.2.
29. Id.
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feature of the US policy landscape. This is true across policy areas
and different kinds of measures. Technological developments and
path dependency make it likely that administrative national
security will remain an important feature of US policy for the
foreseeable future. Hence, courts are likely to face related legal
issues. Administrative law, I suggest below, seems to provide
relevant frameworks and vocabulary for courts in reviewing them.
Second, conceiving of administrative national security as a distinct
category of foreign and security policymaking allows us to both
explain and justify the relatively greater involvement of courts in
reviewing foreign affairs and national security measures in the
past two decades. Prospectively, past experience places a spotlight
on relevant doctrinal tools from administrative law for the courts
to use.
A. Explaining Greater Judicial Involvement
Scholars like Shirin Sinnar, 30 Andrew Kent, 31 Ganesh
Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth, 32 Ashley Deeks, 33 and Steve
Vladeck34 have agreed that courts have become more involved in
foreign and security matters than they were prior to 9/11, even if
they still often avoid deciding related cases on the merits. Studying
administrative national security helps explain why this is so. The
main features of administrative national security—the targeting of
individuals and the central role of administrative agencies—make
measures in this category more likely to be reviewable in court. In
particular, administrative national security measures have greater
chances of meeting APA reviewability requirements.

30. See generally Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in
the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991 (2018).
31 . See generally Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging
Domains: Changing Individual Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2015).
32. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign
Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015).
33. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 873-74 (2013).
34. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Demise of Merits-Based Adjudication in Post-9/11 National
Security Litigation, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2016) (“Even by conservative estimates,
there have been hundreds of civil lawsuits brought over the past 14-plus years challenging
some aspect of post-9/11 national security or counterterrorism policies.”).
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First, individuals targeted by administrative national security
measures are more likely to take legal action than a group of
indirect victims of less specific foreign and security policy action in
the first place. Second, plaintiffs in administrative national security
cases are more likely to have constitutional standing, which
requires a concrete, particularized “injury in fact” that affects the
plaintiff in a personal way; 35 a causal connection between the
injury and the wrongful behavior; and redressability.36 As several
federal courts have already recognized, deprivation of access to
assets,37 restriction of liberty and movement,38 and deprivation of
life39 all satisfy the injury in fact condition. Because administrative
national security measures are tailored to individual targets,
resulting injuries are relatively easy to trace back to government
action.
Furthermore, the APA grants statutory standing to individuals
directly affected by agency action. Section 702 of the APA waives
the federal government’s sovereign immunity for natural and legal
persons challenging wrongful agency action.40 This includes aliens
without substantial ties to the United States—the typical targets of
individualized US measures. Therefore, administrative national
security expands the class of potential plaintiffs able to sue the
government in federal court over foreign and security policy
action. Even when they cannot benefit from the protection of
constitutional provisions like the due process clause because they
lack sufficient ties to the United States,41 the APA still allows them
35. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013) (civil society
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an NSA surveillance program because they could not
show that their personal communications were likely to be intercepted).
36. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d
965 (9th Cir. 2012).
38. Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2019); Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134
(D. Or. 2014).
39. Zaidan v. Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2018).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
41 . See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens
receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”); see also Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 421 (2013) (noting that an attorney’s “foreign client
might not have a viable Fourth Amendment claim” (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
261)); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
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to seek review under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious and
substantial evidence standards.42
For instance, although alleged al-Qaeda financier Yassin
Abdullah Kadi did not have US citizenship, he was able to challenge
his designation by the Treasury Department as a “Specially
Designated Global Terrorist” before the D.C. District Court. He
relied on the APA, the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) and Executive Order 13,224. The District Court
dismissed his substantive claims in 2012. 43
Third, administrative national security measures are more
likely to meet the “agency action” reviewability requirement under
the APA. A government measure must constitute final agency
action to be reviewable.44 The term “agency” is defined in Section
701(b) of the APA as “each authority of the Government of the
United States,” with eight enumerated exceptions. 45 Those
exceptions encompass action by Congress, the courts, as well as the
exercise of military authority on the battlefield.46
The term “agency action” is contested,47 but the courts have
provided some guiding principles. First, the President is not an
agency. His actions are therefore non-reviewable under the APA.
The case law suggests that this exclusion also extends to agency
action that requires the President’s final approval.48 Furthermore,
the challenged agency “action” cannot be general conduct. It must
(concluding that foreign organizations designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
under AEDPA for links to the IRA lacked a sufficient presence in the United States, and
could not assert constitutional due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same).
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1996).
43. Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2012).
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1996).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1996).
46 . 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2011). Under 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2011), “‘agency action’
includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”
47. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095,
1107-12 (2009) (“[T]he staggering variety of governmental bodies, and the extreme
heterogeneity of the circumstances in which they operate, have made it pragmatically
impossible for courts to adhere strictly to the restrictive structure of the APA’s definition
of ‘agency’. . . .”).
48. See Dalton v. Specter, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 1724-25 (1994) (finding a challenge to the
implementation of the President’s decision to close a Philadelphia naval shipyard
unreviewable under the APA); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 2774-75 (1992)
(holding that the APA does not apply to the President because the President is not an
agency within the meaning of the APA).
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be “circumscribed” and “discrete”. 49 Foreign and security policy
often involves the President, and it is generally difficult to identify
sufficiently discrete agency action to challenge. These factors,
among others, have protected this area from judicial review under
the APA.
These features are present in administrative national
security, but they are significantly diminished. Therefore,
administrative national security measures have greater chances of
meeting the “agency action” requirement. As I have argued before,
Whatever the outer limits of “agency action” may be, it is
difficult to think of more discrete action than a measure that
targets a specific person or entity by name, depriving them of
liberty, property, and even their lives. Moreover . . . the
President is only peripherally involved in the application of
many of the individualized measures that form this category.
He has delegated significant policymaking and execution
power to administrative agencies that do qualify as “agencies”
under the APA. The President may be above the APA, but most
agencies that apply administrative national security
measures—including the Departments of Treasury, State,
Homeland Security, and Defense—are not. 50

For example, in Zaidan v. Trump, 51 a case brought by
individuals who claimed that the US government had designated
them for targeted killing, the D.C. District Court concluded that the
case was reviewable under the APA. The Court found that a
decision to place the plaintiffs on the so-called government “Kill
List” was not covered by the military authority exception to the
APA’s definition of “agency.”52 This conclusion relied in large part
on the Washington, D.C.-centered, bureaucratic nature of the
targeted killings process—an elaborate, multiagency process that
was put in place by the Obama administration and maintained with
modifications by his successor.53 In other words, the court framed
a decision that one could think of as traditional military action as
ordinary agency actions covered by the APA.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Dalton, 114 S.Ct. at 1724-25. But see Chachko, supra note 23, at 1133-34.
Chachko, supra note 23, at 1133.
Zaidan v. Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2018).
Id. at 22.
For further analysis of the case, see Chachko, supra note 23, at 1079-80.
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Finally, cases pertaining to individuals should be harder to
dismiss on political question grounds than generalized challenges
to policy. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted
two factors that should govern the application of the political
question doctrine: the existence of a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department” and “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards” for resolving the question at issue. 54 There is in
principle law to apply in the area of administrative national
security, where the key issue is the legality of the outcome of an
agency adjudication of an individual case. If the individual is
protected by the Constitution, applicable law includes the APA and
relevant statutes, due process, and possibly other constitutional
provisions. If the targeted individual is an alien not protected by
the Constitution, there remains APA arbitrary and capriciousness
review. These standards are arguably judicially manageable.
B. Justifying Judicial Review
Accounting for administrative national security also offers a
justification for judicial review in this category. It challenges
functional assumptions the conventional wisdom about the role of
courts in foreign affairs and national security has long relied upon.
First, government action in this category directly affects
individuals and resembles ordinary administrative adjudication.
Resolving related cases does not necessarily require unique
expertise, but rather application of run-of-the-mill administrative
law and due process doctrine. This task is hardly foreign to the
judiciary.
Second, arguments for increased deference related to
expertise, secrecy, and dispatch lose much of their force in cases
pertaining to administrative national security. As for dispatch,
individuals are generally only able to challenge the measures
targeting them after the fact—that is, after their assets were
frozen, or after they were blacklisted, detained, or shot at from a
drone.55 The measures presumptively remain in place throughout
the judicial proceedings. Consequently, judicial review in
administrative national security is unlikely to impede any urgent
54. 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012).
55. See, for example, the cases cited supra notes 37-39.
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foreign policy or national security action. It does not require a
quick decision that courts have been said to be incapable of.
With respect to expertise and secrecy, the universe of
evidence that the government might be required to provide, and
courts need to process, in administrative national security cases is
relatively narrow. It should include the facts rendering a person
targetable under the relevant authorities. It does not require
courts to understand complex international dynamics and
interests and grapple with abstract policy problems. Concerns
about “sacrificing” classified information are mitigated by the
availability of ex parte, in camera consideration.
To be sure, these functional arguments do not go to the
democratic legitimacy and accountability prong of the argument
for increased judicial deference in foreign affairs and national
security. I do not suggest that debate. “These arguments do,
however, call for a more nuanced approach to the judicial role
when it comes to administrative national security—and offer a
justification for judicial review in related cases.”56
III. TESTING INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
Do courts have sufficient expertise to decide foreign and
security matters? Can they do so despite not having full access to
classified material or the necessary personnel to assess its validity
and meaning? Can courts move fast enough to ensure that no harm
would come to national foreign and security interests due to
delayed action? What are the broader policy implications of
judicial review in foreign affairs?
These questions lend themselves to empirical investigation,
yet few comprehensive studies have been conducted thus far to
attempt to shine new light on them. Much of the existing empirical
scholarship focuses on explaining why courts defer to the political
branches on foreign and security policy and gauging how often
they do so.57 In other words, the focus has been on explaining and
56. Chachko, supra note 23, at 1137.
57. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME SILENCE DURING WAR 71 (2003); Lee
Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-war Cases, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269. See also Deeks, supra note 33, at 876-79.
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documenting judicial behavior, not gauging its external
implications. I am aware of only a handful of US empirical studies
that assess the impact of judicial review on policy outside the
courts, which is essential for evaluating the common institutional
arguments against judicial review in foreign affairs and national
security.58
One of the reasons for this relative lack of research is the
dearth of case law in which courts have in fact weighed in on the
merits of foreign affairs and national security questions. Rarer still
are examples of sustained judicial engagement with such issues
over sufficiently long periods of time to allow for comprehensive
analysis of the policy impact of judicial review. The great variety of
foreign and security cases and their uneven procedural postures
also make it difficult to draw any general conclusions through
systematic inquiry.
In addition, it is not easy to measure the full impact of judicial
engagement on policy in this area. Unlike domestic policy, where
policymakers are required by law to meet certain publication and
transparency requirements, foreign and security action is
notoriously non-transparent. Government action in this area is
protected by layers of covert or secret interactions, classification
and statutory exemptions, from the APA’s foreign affairs and
military functions exception to exemptions from disclosure in
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).59 Nevertheless, case studies
exist and can be better utilized by researchers.
In previous work I took on this task, albeit outside the US
context.60 I focused on the case study of the Court of Justice of the
European Union’s (“CJEU”) targeted economic sanctions
jurisprudence. The EU courts have been conducting vigorous
judicial review of hundreds of individualized targeted sanctions
that the European Union has levied against natural and legal
persons to advance its Common Foreign and Security Policy
(“CFSP”). These sanctions typically freeze the assets of those
58 . See, e.g., Aziz Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2010)
(empirically studying the impact of the Supreme Court decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008), on US detention policy). Compare Yoav Dotan, Legalizing the
Unlegalizable: Terrorism, Secret Services and Judicial Review in Israel 1970-2001, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT 190 (Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004).
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1966); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (1978); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)
(2016).
60. See Chachko, supra note 2.
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designated, impose related financial restrictions, or ban
designated persons from entering the EU.
As I previously wrote, “[t]he EU courts have walked a fine line
between protecting designated persons and entities from arbitrary
designation and overtly interfering with EU foreign policy.” The
courts have consistently deferred to the EU political institutions
when it came to foreign and security policy decisions, such as
designing sanctions criteria or selecting whom to target with
sanctions. “When the courts struck down sanctions,” I observed,
“they did so only on due process grounds, such as the European
Union’s failure to state the reasons supporting its decision to place
a particular entity under sanctions or to provide sufficient
evidence to substantiate those reasons.”61
By limiting intervention to the procedural aspects of sanctions
decisions, the EU courts have preserved the Council of the
European Union’s (“the Council”) policy discretion. They have
allowed the Council to maintain its policy decisions by fixing the
procedural flaws identified by the courts and re-imposing
sanctions that the courts previously struck down. This procedureoriented approach provided a useful case study for assessing the
impact of process-focused judicial review of foreign and security
matters.
The EU sanctions case study is illuminating because it has rare
attributes as far as foreign and security judicial adjudication goes:
it offers a large number of EU sanctions cases decided on the merits
over several years, as well as constant and relatively transparent
back-and-forth between EU policymakers and courts over
sanctions thanks to the institutional mechanics of the European
Union. This allowed for both a comprehensive and granular
analysis of the political-judicial dialogue around this issue and the
practical implications of the EU courts’ form of intervention in the
foreign and security space—due process review.
The study relied on an original dataset that included 204
decisions issued by EU courts between July 2009 and March 2017.
The decisions reviewed the legality of individual financial
sanctions the EU imposed in the framework of its Iran and Syria
sanctions regimes—both salient issues at the top of the EU and the
global agenda during the research period. The study traced how
61. Id. at 4.
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the EU Council responded to judicial intervention. It did not only
document the Council’s specific response to each judicial decision;
the study also explored how judicial intervention influenced the
general policy principles behind the individual sanctions.
The study produced several key findings. The rate of
individual EU Iran and Syria sanctions that the EU courts struck
down on due process grounds was very high. Seventy-three
percent of the sanctions challenged in court for the first time were
struck down. If we account for repeat-challenges—sanctions
challenged for the second or third time after being struck down in
previous litigation—invalidated sanctions constituted sixty-four
percent of all reviewed sanctions in the dataset. The results of
second and third challenges, however, were better for the EU
Council. It successfully defended most of the sanctions that the
courts had previously struck down (twenty-five out of thirty-two
sanctions).
Policymakers pushed back in response to the judicial
decisions by relisting many of the persons and entities that won in
court. Sixty-two percent of the persons and entities whose
designation the courts struck down remained listed despite
judicial intervention. At the same time, the EU Council did not
reimpose thirty-two percent of the annulled sanctions, and more
sanctions were probably eliminated in the shadow of judicial
review.
In other words, a substantial number of the reviewed
sanctions were eliminated in the process of judicial review. This
fact suggests that the process of reconsideration triggered by
judicial review led the EU Council to forgo non-essential sanctions
in the general scheme of its Iran and Syria sanctions policies. 62
Because the courts only annulled sanctions on procedural grounds,
the relisting option was always available to the EU Council in cases
in which it deemed the sanctions important enough to maintain.
Finally, the Council expanded listing criteria in both the Iran
and Syria sanctions regimes, at least in part to reduce the risk of
further judicial intervention. The broader the criteria, the less
challenging it should be for the Council to meet the procedural
requirements of reasons and evidence without exposing sources
62. Id. at Part 4.B. There are, of course, other plausible interpretations of these
findings. I discuss them at greater length. Id. at 37-40.
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and methods. It is much easier to prove that someone is “providing
support to the government of Iran” or is a prominent
businessperson in Syria than it is to prove that they are directly
involved in covert nuclear proliferation or specific human rights
violations.
One could argue that the courts’ approach created an
incentive structure that eventually resulted in greater potential
harm to individual rights, even if it somewhat improved
compliance with due process in individual cases and helped weed
out non-essential sanctions. By forcing the Council to expand
listing criteria in order to maintain certain sanctions, the courts
ended up exposing a significantly larger category of individuals to
sanctions. This critique has some force, but it seems to be
exaggerated. Other incentives counterbalance the incentive to
expand listing criteria solely for the instrumental reason of
shielding sanctions from judicial invalidation.63
The empirical study suggests, then, that judicial review had an
impact on both substantive EU policy decisions and the EU
Council’s compliance with due process obligations. Granted,
judicial annulment of sanctions ultimately did not help designated
persons and entities in the majority of the cases in the dataset, as
they remained on the sanctions lists. Nevertheless, sanctions were
not re-imposed in almost a third of the cases. As I elaborate in the
study, the fact that the Council did not reimpose judiciallyinvalidated sanctions in about one third of the cases indicates that
judicial review successfully “elicited policymakers preferences as
to which individual sanctions were actually essential to achieving
EU policy goals with regard to Iran and Syria, [eliminated]
excessive sanctions, and [encouraged] the Council to adhere to
more robust procedures before imposing sanctions.” 64 The
findings of the empirical study lend support to the claim that
procedural judicial review could “reconcile some degree of
oversight of foreign policy and national security measures with
institutional concerns that have long stood in the way of judicial
review in those areas.”65 By leaving substantive policy judgments
to the EU Council while enforcing strict due process requirements,
procedural review “facilitated a dynamic of accountability without
63. Id. at 41-33.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 6.
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substantially hindering the Council’s ability to achieve its policy
goals.”66
Of course, this study has clear limits. The findings might be a
product of the different constitutional structure of the EU, which
explicitly grants standing to designated persons and entities, and a
more interventionist inclination of the EU courts compared to their
American counterparts. They may have been an artifact of the
subject matter—individual economic sanctions—and would
therefore not translate very well to other areas of foreign affairs
and national security. Further research is undoubtedly required.
Yet, the EU case study does allow us to study general
questions of administrative law and institutional competence in
foreign affairs that are relevant for the US debate. It lends support
to the claim that procedural judicial review might be an acceptable
compromise between oversight and policy discretion in certain
areas of foreign affairs and national security. Many scholars have
advanced a similar claim in other areas of administrative and
constitutional law.67
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183-98 (2d ed. 1986) (describing how courts “can avoid
constitutional adjudication without causing hardship to litigants, by resort to special rules
of procedure or to techniques of statutory construction, or both”); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-74, 87-88 (Harvard University
Press 1980) (advocating “a participation-oriented representation-reinforcing approach to
judicial review”). See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 336-42 (1988) (describing
various legal process theories); Ittai Bar-Siman- Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial
Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1958-62 (2011) (critiquing the
resistance to judicial review of the legislative process); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of
Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1587 (2001) (describing nine types of structural
rules that “[facilitate] a judicial ‘remand’ of a challenged program for reevaluation by
nonjudicial government employees”); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L.
REV. 197, 200 (1976) (examining the meaning of due process in lawmaking in the context
of judicial review); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional
Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 4
(2008) (arguing that courts should “raise the costs to government decisionmakers of
enacting constitutionally problematic policies rather than attempting to designate certain
government actions . . . as impermissible”); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 269, 269; Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law:
Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871 (2001).
In the national security context, see generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach
to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2004) (demonstrating that US courts
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The study suggests that courts are capable of addressing
pressing foreign and security matters without excessively taxing
policymakers and their preferred policy choices. It is an example of
relatively aggressive judicial review in foreign affairs and national
security that has created what seems to be a sustainable
equilibrium of cooperation between courts and policymakers
around individual sanctions decisions. The EU courts have
invalidated dozens of sanctions imposed to address critical issues,
and the sky did not fall.
Due to the procedural focus of the courts, policymakers were
able to maintain their original policy choices where they deemed
them necessary for advancing EU interests. They also managed to
reduce judicial intervention by learning and improving the due
process aspects of their decisions. Judicial intervention did not
seem to discourage the use of targeted sanctions in EU foreign
policy, which has relied heavily on targeted sanctions for well over
a decade despite constant judicial intervention.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Flaherty’s book revisits a debate that has become
stagnant: whether courts should weigh in on foreign affairs and
national security matters. The book advances this debate by
looking beyond traditional arguments and drawing on other
disciplines.
Similarly, this Essay invites scholars to think creatively about
judicial review in the foreign and security space and pursue
underexplored avenues for assessing and challenging the
conventional wisdom in this area. In particular, it calls for more
careful empirical evaluation of the functional arguments against
judicial intervention in foreign and security matters, and building
on administrative law to approach such matters in light of
have in fact applied procedural review in emergencies); Joseph Landau, Muscular
Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661
(2009) (arguing that US courts have conditioned deference in the national security context
on the executive’s compliance with procedural requirements); Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2004) (defending a judicial minimalism
approach to national security cases that focuses on procedural requirements such as
congressional authorization and hearing rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement
Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2006). For
discussion of this theory, see Chachko, supra note 2, at 33-37.
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developments in the nature of US foreign and security policy in the
21st century.
Pursuing these research agendas would broaden our
perspective and allow us to move beyond the traditional
constitutional vocabulary that both skeptics and supporters of
judicial review in foreign affairs and national security have long
framed their arguments around. It would also provide courts with
more sophisticated doctrinal tools with which to address related
cases—and perhaps cast foreign policy and national security in a
slightly less mythical light.

1284

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:5

